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ADOPTION-RELIGIOUS FAITH OF ADOPTING PARENTS As A
BAR TO ADOPTION
Plaintiffs, Presbyterians, petitioned to adopt twin children approxi-
mately five months old who were baptized Roman Catholics, with the
intention of raising the children as Presbyterians. Lower courts denied
petition because of religious differences. Illinois Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded holding statute is discretionary and religious differ-
ences do not per se bar adoption. Religious faith of adopting parents
is a factor for consideration, but primary importance is to be given to
the best interests of the children. Cooper 'v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 140
N.E. 2d 293 (1957).
From the standpoint of the child's future' and the significance
to society, 2 the importance of proper adoption is apparent; therefore the
problem of differences in religion between the adopting parents and
the child merits careful consideration. The number of states with
statutes on the subject indicates a legislative acceptance of the general
public's desire to have religious influences respected in adoption pro-
ceedings.3  Nevertheless, courts have differed in their determination
of the emphasis to be given to these statutes and this divergence may
not be completely attributable to the varied language of the statutes. The
issue may be phrased: when there is a difference in religion between the
child and the couple desiring to adopt, is it permissible under these
statutes to allow adoption? This issue necessitates determining whether
the legislation requires that religious dissimilarity alone should be con-
clusive. Consequently, involved here are typical questions of statutory
interpretation: legislative intent, purpose of legislation, reasonableness
ascribed to the legislature or the manipulative nexus the court might
choose, i.e., the child's welfare.4
1". .. There is a substantial and growing body of evidence, all of which
points to the desirability of placing a child in a permanent home as early,
chronologically, as possible . . . the lack of attention, stimulation and stable
relationships with one dependable person seems to be harmful to intellectual and
personality development." Martire and McCandless, Psychological Alspects of
4doption Process, 40 IOWA L.R. 350, 359 (1955).
2,"Its importance may be traced directly to sound public policy in providing
a home for the homeless child and a child for the childless couple, as well as
relieving natural parents of responsibilities they are unable to meet and the
community oft he burden of caring for the child." Taft, Robert, Jr., Some Problems
Under the Adoption Law of Ohio, 13 OHIO STATE L.J. 48 (1952).
3 Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianship and Custody, 54 COL.
L.R. 376 (1954), contains an exhaustive listing of pertinent state statutes and
comprehensive discussion of the problem in this area.
4 "Modern social science, especially with the growth of child psychology,
provides the courts with tools enabling them to make the decision in the child's
best interests . ..The existence of scientific methods whereby it may be deter-
mined rationally what is in the child's best interests militates in favor of increased
and intensive judicial effort to insure the most desirable future for any child who
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The Illinois Statute provides: "The court in entering a decree of
adoption shall, whenever possible, give custody through adoption to a
petitioner or petitioners of the same religious belief as that of the
child."' The principal case clearly enunciates a discretionary interpre-
tation of this type statute. The theme of this decision accents the
overall best interests of the child to the extent that it would permit
adoption even with the clearly expressed intention of raising the child
in a different faith. This interpretation indicates that the statute re-
quires religion to be considered along with other factors; religion alone is
not determinative.
The adoption statutes of two states6 are express on the matter of
religious affiliation; adoption is only permitted where the faiths are
the same. However, other states with statutes similar in tenor to the
Illinois statute have followed a mandatory interpretation. In constru-
ing their then new statute,' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
in Petition of Gaily,s held that the court was "bound to give controlling
effect to identity of religious faith when practicable, but not otherwise,"
as there was no intent that identity of religion should be the sole or neces-
sarily the principal consideration. Later Massachusetts opinions dis-
tinguished the Gaily case e.g., the court denied adoption by members
of a different religious faith where evidence was presented of adoption
applications by members of the same faith.' In the widely publicized case
of Ellis v. McCoy,"0 the Massachusetts court permitted the child's mother
to withdraw her consent to the adoption. In the latter case the court
recognized the statute as establishing the weight of the religious factor
on the merits of the natural mother's request to withdraw consent. The
child was then about two years old and had been in the Ellis' possession
since shortly after birth.
is unfortunate enough to have his fate left to a court." Id. at 395.
It is suggested in a parallel problem that, "When custody is contested, a
social study should be mandatory to enable the court to have adequate information
for determining which, if either, parent should be granted custody or whether it
should be given to another person or agency." Sheridan, The Family Court.
CHILDREN, Vol. 4, No. 267, 70 (March-April 1957).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953 c. 4 ss 4-2.
0 DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 13, s. 911 (1953): Religious Affiliations: "No child
born out of wedlock shall be placed for adoption unless at least one of the
prospective adopting parents shall be of the same religion as the natural mother,
or of the religion in which she has reared the child or allowed it to be reared . . ."
Nevertheless, this section further provides that the mother can execute a notarized
statement specifying religion in which it is desired the child be reared or that the
mother is indifferent to this matter. Also, R. I. PuB. LAWS C. 1772, s. 1 (1496)
amending P.L. (1944) c. 1441, s. 26.
7 MASS. ANN. LAws c. 210, s 5B (1954): "In making orders for adoption the
judge when practicable must give custody only to persons of the same religious
faith as that of the child. In the event that there is a dispute as to religion of
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A mandatory construction" of their pertinent statutes' 2 has been
pursued by the courts of New York. 3 The case of In re Santos 4 was
widely noted when the New York Court honored the natural mother's
objection even though the children had been raised in the other religion
for approximately four years and the mother had apparently originally
agreed to such upbringing.
In general, it would appear that the pertinent statutory language
does not require a construction that the faith of the child and the adopting
parents always be the same. First, permissive words are employed, e.g.,
"whenever possible," or "whenever practicable." Second, remembering
that adoption is purely a statutory procedure it would be essential for the
legislature to set forth factors to be considered in decreeing an adoption.
In view of these facts it is highly likely that "the purpose behind the
passage of the religious clause is to assure that religion will be rendered
proper consideration in adoption proceedings."'
15
The necessity of a discretionary construction of such a statute
appears from the widely divergent possibilities that may arise. That a
great many of the states' adoption laws provide for investigation of the
prospective adopting parents' home and a report by welfare agencies with
a recommendation to the court in itself indicates that this is a situation
fraught with variables and an intention to promote the welfare of the
said child, its religion shall be deemed to be that of its mother. .. "
8 Petition of Gaily, 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E. 2d 21 (1952). Child's mother
consented to the adoption and did not object to the change in religion.
9 Petition of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E. 2d 843 (1954) ; cert. denied,
348 U.S. 942 (1955).
1°Ellis v. McCoy, 332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E. 2d 266 (1955); Ellis v. Doherty
(same case but pertains to disregard of order in Ellis v. McCoy), ___ Mass. _,
136 N.E. 2d 203 (1956). The Ellis family disregarded the court order and kept the
child. They moved to Florida where a court recently permitted adoption. N.Y.
Times, July 11, 1957, p. 52, col. 1.
1 In re Adoption of Anonymous, 88 N.Y.S. 829 (1949); Adoption of
Anonymous, 137 N.Y.S. 2d 720 (1955).
12 N.Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 113: " . • In making orders of adoption
the judge .. .when practicable must give custody only to persons of the same
religious faith as that of the child in accordance with Art VI of Social Welfare
Law."
N. Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW §373, sub. 4: "The provisions of subdivisions
1, 2, 3, of this section shall be so interpreted as to assure that in the care, pro-
tection, adoption, guardianship, discipline and control of any child, its religious
faith shall be prcserved and protected."
13 Cf. Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E. 2d 812 (1954). Mother
granted separation and custody of child on condition child be raised as Roman
Catholic in accordance with an antenuptial agreement. Judgment modified to
permit child to attend church of his choice and to transfer from parochial school
to public school on basis of referee's finding that this was necessary for the boy's
welfare.
14 in re Santos, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1951).
5 Note, Religious Factors in Adoption, 28 IND. L.J. 401, 406 (1953).
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child. Individual situations varying according to the child's age, en-
vironmental background, and faith are manifestly apparent. Where
the child has received religious indoctrination, it might well be inadvisable
to permit adoption by members of a different faith on the ground of best
interest of the child, for to do otherwise might create conflict and con-
fusion in the child. But, where no religious training has been received
(perhaps because the child is too young to understand and appreciate its
significance) it would seem tenuous to say a court can only permit
adoption by people of the same faith. In a situation where the natural
parent favors the adoption by the members of the different religion,
the court has another factor to consider.
In the instant case the natural father of the children is Lutheran
and their three older children were baptized Lutheran. The natural
father consented to the adoption, but the natural mother did not. There
was conflicting evidence as to whether the natural mother was in fact
a Catholic (although the twins were baptized Catholic) and on her
fitness as a mother. Were it not for the baptism of the twins it would
be difficult to determine their religion because of the divergent faiths' 6
of the parents. As the Illinois statute speaks of adoption by a petitioner
of the same religious belief as that "of the child" it may well be asked
whether the child has a religious belief. It is apparent in this instance that
the court considers the baptism of the twins as establishing the children's
religious belief. Here again is a variable in the adoption problem. In
some faiths the baptism establishes the child's religion; in others, the
child's faith is considered to be that of the natural parents until the child
is himself able to accept the church's doctrine.
1 7
In parallel situations courts have emphasized the child's welfare.
In Kuntz v. Stackhousels the trial court recognized that no statute re-
quired that a child's custody be given to a member of the same religion as
the child and found the requirement by analogy to the requirement of
the adoption law. The upper court reversed, holding that paramount
consideration in cases of this nature is at all times the welfare of the
child, which includes its physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-
being, and that religion is not a determining factor. Other cases"9 vary-
ing from the instant case because of the type of action (custody or
guardianship) or intent to raise the child in its own faith, nevertheless
16 St. George's Adoption, 45 Pa. D. & C. 387 (1942). Not possible to have an
adoption by members of the same faith as the parents because although the
petitioner's faith was the same as the natural mother's; the natural father was
of another faith. Adoption permitted.
17 Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 694, 695 (1952).
18 Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel Kuntz v. Stackhouse, 176 Pa. Super 361,
108 A. 2d 73, (1954). Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel Donie v. Ferree, 175 Pa.
Super. 586, 106 A. 2d 681 (1954).
19 In re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479, 109 A. 683 (1920). Guardianship.
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emphasizes the child's welfare over and above the question of religion
alone. From an Ohio standpoint, emphasis is placed on the best interests
of the child by statute.2"
Even the dissent in the instant case agrees that the court has dis-
cretion, but finds in the record a disregard of the statute by the probation
officer and that there were qualified families of the same faith available
to adopt the children. The dissent feels that the trial court was therefore
within its discretion in dismissing the petition. Under the majority
position it would seem that these matters would be considered by the
lower courts along with religion in finding what will be best for the child.
In summary, from the standpoint of the person most to be affected
by such a decision, the adoptee, it would seem that where the statute is
not explicit the court should exercise its discretion.
S. R. Jaffy
Paternal grandfather indicated willingness to raise children in their faith. In re
McKenzie, 197 Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746 (1936). Petitioners had child for three
years and agreed to raise child in its faith.
20 OHio REV. ConE (1953) §3107.09: "... If after hearing the court is
satisfied . . . that the petitioner is suitably qualified to care for and rear the child,
and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption . ."
OfHo REV. CODE (1953) §3107.05 (E) Provides for the inclusion in the investiga-
tion report of "The suitability of the adoption of the child by the petitioner,
taking into account their respective racial, religious, and cultural backgrounds,
and the child's own attitude toward the adoption in any case in which the child's
age makes this feasible." Also, OHIo REV. CODE (1953) §3107.11.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONGRESSIONAL PRE-EMPTION OF
THE FIELD OF SEDITION-CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF
FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES
Defendant was convicted of violating the Pennsylvania Sedition
Act. After affirmance by the Superior Court, and reversal by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, the State of Pennsylvania was granted certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court, considering only the narrow issue
of supersedure, found that the Smith Act superseded the Pennsylvania
Sedition Act. Decision was based upon three factors: (a) evident con-
gressional intent to pre-empt the field of anti-sedition legislation, (b)
predominant federal interest in the field of sedition, (c) the danger of
conflict between the enforcment of state and of federal anti-sedition
programs. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497 (1956); reh. den.
351 U.S. 934 (1957).
Under the division of power between Nation and State as effected
by the Constitution of the United States, some matters ,are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.' Whether or not, therefore, Con-
I See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 42 (1907), (control over the flag of
the United States) ; Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254- U.S. 325, 331 (1920), (the power
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gress acts, the States have no power to legislate. Issues of supersedure
arise where a state may act in the absence of any occupation of the field
by the Congress, which by the Supremacy Clause of Article VI has the
ultimate, paramount authority to act.2  Whether in these situations
Congress has intended to supersede State action is thus the controlling
question.3 In a few cases Congressional desire can be determined by
referral to express provisions in the federal statute;4 but more com-
monly the question must be resolved by resorting to less conclusive means
for ascertaining the will of Congress.'
The Supreme Court of the United States resolves the problems
arising from legislative competition of this type by invoking one of two
doctrines of statutory interpretation. These are conflict and pre-emption.
In conflict the Court looks to the substantive content of the enactments
finding the state act to be inoperative only if there is direct conflict between
it and the purposes and objectives of the federal statute.6 Under this
doctrine either the terms of the statutes are contradictory, or com-
pliance with one act would constitute a violation of the other. The
problem which usually confronts the courts is determining "degree,"
for black and white cases are the exception rather than the rule. In
pre-emption the Court compares the state statute with the federal legis-
lation touching upon the same subject in the light of pre-determined
judicial criteria, or yardsticks.7 Under this doctrine the federal legisla-
tion is considered from its four corners, taking into account its content,
objectives, legislative history, and its effectiveness.' If the state statute
falls within the scope of any one of the prescribed criteria, as determined
by the federal legislation, it must be declared inoperative.9
to raise and maintain armies); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299, 320 (1952), (the right to regulate commerce).
2 U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
3 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824); U.S. v. Mayo, 47 F.
Supp. 552 (D.C. Fla. 1942), Aff'd., 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943).
4See Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How. 1859) 227, 243; McDermott v.
Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 132 (1913); Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
5 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941) ; Hill v. Florida ex rel.
Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945) ; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S.
148, 167 (1942).
6 See supra note 4.
7 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Compare
Napier v. At. Coastline R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 612 (1926) with Terminal Ass'n. v.
Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 7 (1943). The former holds that the physical circum-
stances should be considered, regardless of the ends sought, while the latter
differentiates state and federal acts by the somewhat vague and frequently over-
lapping ends of "safety" and "health."
8 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., supra note 7.
Old. (warehousing licensing); Hines v. Davidowitz (alien registration),
supra note 5; International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus (Bankruptcy proceedings),
278 U.S. 261 (1926).
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Both the majority and the dissenting justices in the Nelson case
approached the problem through use of pre-emption doctrines. There
seems to be no apparent explanation of the reasons why one court will
resort to a conflict doctrine and another, e.g. Nelson, will decide the
case in terms of pre-emption. Perhaps the answer lies in the clarity and
directness of the terms of the statutes; the more obvious the fact pattern,
the more prone the courts are to resolve the issues in terms of conflict.10
The majority based their findings upon the tests of pre-emption articu-
lated by the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of Rice v. Santa Ie
Elevator Corp," wherein the Court found the necessity for strict
uniformity in the area of warehouse licensing. The principal criteria
recognized in the Rice decision are: (1) pervasiveness of federal regula-
tions-calling for strict uniformity and pre-emption of concurrent state
acts; this criterion should be considered satisfied only upon judicial
determination that the legislature, after thorough study of the breadth
of the problem has exhaustively treated the area; (2) dominant federal
interest-resulting in statutes that are inseparable from the responsibilities
of the national government; (3) duplication of purpose--creating inde-
pendent state and federal legislation to accomplish the same ends or
operate upon the same object; (4) inconsistency of result-caused by
the interference with, or execution of, the federal act by operation of
the state statute.
In the light of the Rice criteria the majority's reasoning in the
Nelson case appears to have little merit. The majority's finding of an
"evident purpose to pre-empt" seems short of the "pervasiveness" re-
quired in Rice. It seems to be stretching to an extreme the power of an
inference, to find that the existence of two statutes, the Internal Security
Act of 19502 and the Communist Control Act of 1954," enacted from
ten to fifteen years after the Smith Act,14 and related solely to the
narrow scope of "Communist" activities (in comparison with the breadth
of sedition),'5 should satisfy the requiste "clear and direct" expression
of congressional intent to place all control of sedition in the hands of
10 Compare the cases cited in note 4, supra with those cited in note 5, supra.
11 See supra note 7.
12 50 U.S.C.A. §§781-798.
13 50 U.S.C.A. §841.
14 54 STAT. 670, as amended in 1948, 18 U.S.C.A. §2385. This statute was
enacted in 1940, and is formally known as the Alien Registration Act. It estab-
lished a national criminal policy which proscribes the advocacy of the overthrow
of any United States government (local, state, or federal) by force and violence.
15 The crime of sedition does not require any overt act of violence, or actual
arising against the government. It is sufficient that an act of advocacy is likely
to incite. This distinguishes Sedition from Rebellion or Insurrection. See GELLHORN,
THE STATES AND SUBVERSION, Appendix A, 396-7 (1952).
16 Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847). Cf. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254
U.S. 325, 331 (1920).
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federal authority.'" This doubt is strengthened when considered with
the fact that when the Smith Act was amended, eight years after its
adoption, no expression of dominant federal responsibility was sug-
gested,"7 although by that date there had already been a pronounced
movement by the individual states to enact their own sedition laws.'
s
This reasoning applies with equal effect to the majority's finding of
"predominant federal interest" as the result of the supposed similarity
of purpose between the Internal Security and Communist Control Acts,
on the one hand, and the Smith Act on the other. Although the legis-
lative history of the Smith Act reveals strong national interest in sub-
version, there were no indications that the Act was intended to exclude
state activity. 9 There is even some expert opinion to the effect that
federal-state cooperation in controlling subversion would not only be
beneficial, but necessary. 2
0
The "danger of conflict," which is the majority's third and last
reason for upholding pre-emption (not to be confused with the "conflict"
theory of supersedure, referred to earlier) is, by its own terms, a simple
example of preventative adjudication. The legal history of the Smith Act
provides no record of either a past or present conflict with state sedition
statutes. 2' Thus, while the Nelson decision is framed in terms of Rice
criteria, and consequently appears valid on its face, its underlying facts
raise doubtful questions of the substantiality of the Nelson hypothesis,
particularly when viewed in the light of the substantive principles upon
which the Rice criteria were established. The only Rice criterion upon
which the Nelson decision could validly have been predicated is that
of "duplication of purpose." However, the Court gives no indication
that it had this criterion in mind when it arrived at the decision.
The dissenters, refuting the majority's supersedure argument solely
in terms of pre-emption and without any reference to the "conflict"
theory, find fault with the majority's attempt to "lead" the Congress.
The strength of the dissenting opinion lies in combining the refutation
of the majority's weakest grounds, (lack of sufficient criteria for finding
either exclusiveness or dominant federal interest, plus an unwillingness,
based solely on fear, to permit preventative adjudication) with two of
the strongest arguments that can be advanced for concurrent legislation
of both state and federal acts (the right of the states to exercise their
police power over local criminal matters, and the requirement that
17 H.R. Rep. No. 2980, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 225-46 (1950) (The Un-American
Activities Comm.).
is See Digest of the Public Record of Communism in the United States 266-
306 (Fund for the Republic, 1955).
19 See, Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on H.R. 5138, 76th
Cong. 3d Sess., 5-12 (1940); 86 Cong. Rec. 9031-32 (1940).
20 See New York Times (Nelson case), Sept. 15, 1955, p. 19.
21 Cf., Brief of the Department of Justice, amicus curiae, p. 30-31, cited in
the Nelson case, 350 U. S. at 518.
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Congressional intent be "clear and definite" before existing state legis-
lation is prescribed). Perhaps the most decisive point of the dissenters
is one that is of late receiving too little consideration by the Court.
They assert that this case should be governed by the "Savings Clause"
of Title 18 of the United States Code, in which the Smith Act appears. 2
Prior rulings of the Court interpreting this clause indicate that in the
absence of express Congressional intent to the contrary, the states should
have the freedom to engage in concurrent legislation. 23  It would seem
that the deference normally afforded "express Congressional provisions"
by the Court demanded a contrary decision in the instant case, or at least
a greater consideration than the majority apparently gave it.
Lawrence H. Stotter
22 18 U.S.C.A. §3231. This Title codifies the federal criminal laws. Section
3231 provides: "Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the
jurisdiction of the courts of the several states under the laws thereof."
23 Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319, 324-5 (1903).
HABEAS CORPUS-INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS-DENIAL OF CERTIORARI AS RES JUDICATA
Petitioner under sentence of death for causing his 13 year old son
to murder petitioner's wife filed identical habeas corpus petitions simul-
taneously in the California Supreme Court and in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Di-
vision. The petitions contained general allegations that a material witness
had given perjured testimony under coercion from a deputy district
attorney. The state court denied the petition without opinion the same
day it was filed. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court refused
to grant certiorari, also without filing an opinion.
The District Court, which had been holding the twin petition in
abeyance pending exhaustion of the state remedies, promptly dismissed
the petition on the ground that the Supreme Court of California had
"fully and adequately considered all matters presented to it by petitioner."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
by a two to one decision on the grounds that an identical petition had
been denied by the state court and that the United States Supreme Court
had refused certiorari. This time the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Held: per curiam, the judgment of the circuit court
vacated and remanded to the district court for a hearing on the allega-
tions of the petition. Simpson v. Teets, 353 U. S. 926 (1957).
By failing to comment on the circuit court opinion, the United
States Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify two major points
in a field that has been labeled "an untidy area of our law that calls for
more systematic consideration than it has thus far received."'
1 Simal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947).
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The primary purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to make
certain that one who was unable to assert his rights or was unaware of
the significance of relevant facts prior to conviction is not unjustly im-
prisoned.2 The court is restricted in its function to an examination of
the legality of the commitment in light of due process requirements.
2
Federal courts may interfere by habeas corpus with a state in the adminis-
tration of its criminal law only where fundamental rights particularly
secured by the federal constitution are invaded.4
Justification for denying petitioner's writ was attempted by the
circuit court on two grounds. The first of these is that an identical writ
had already been denied by the state court system. The majority position
on this point is best summed up by the concurring opinion as follows:
It would be presumptious for this court to order the district
court to take testimony upon the same petition which the
highest California court had denied, especially since certiorari
to that tribunal was refused by the supreme court of the federal
system.5
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that it
is the duty of a federal court to review facts in a habeas corpus proceeding
even though a state tribunal has already given them the most careful
consideration.' The dissent points out that the federal court could have
given consideration to the state court's decision had it given "fair con-
sideration to the issues and offered evidence." 7 However, in the present
case there was no state court transcript available since petitioner did not
receive a hearing on the merits. Since the state court failed to reach the
constitutional issue the denial of the writ is not binding on the district
court.8 Further, petitioner is entitled to a hearing on an issue raised for
the first time on habeas corpus proceedings where the allegations, if true,
would be such as to show a denial of due process of law in the trial at
which he was convicted.9 Where there is no denial of these allegations
they must be assumed to be true for the purpose of the hearing."0 The
228 U.S.C. §377, (later incorporated into 28 U.S.C. §1651).
3In re Metzger, 46 U. S. 176 (1847); Eagles v. U. S., 329 U. S. 304 (1946);
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1952).
4 Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425 (1905) ; Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
5 Simpson v. Teets, 239 F. 2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1956).
6 "Whatever anomaly there may be in demanding that a bench of one or
more federal judges sitting in review on facts to which a state tribunal has
already given the most careful and conscientious consideration, there is no doubt
of its duty to do so." U.S. v. Denno, 288 F. 2d 605, (2d Cir. 1953) citing Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1952), and Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1952).
7 Simpson v. Teets, 239 F. 2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1956).
sBrown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1952).
9 Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954) ; Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266
(1948); Pyle v. State of Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935).
10 Thomas v. Teets, 205 F. 2d 236 (9th Cir. 1953); White v. Ragen, 324
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United States Supreme Court has recently held that failure to grant a
hearing on a prisoner's allegation of denial of due process is grounds for
reversal "no matter how heinous the crime in question and no matter how
guilty an accused may ultimately be found to be.""
The circuit court concurring opinion attempts to justify the reliance
on the state court's dismissal of the petition even though there was no
hearing granted petitioner. It reasoned as follows: the state supreme
court was thoroughly familiar with the facts in the case since it had
heard petitioner's appeal from his conviction prior to the filing of the
habeas corpus petition.12 At that trial the state court had accepted the
testimony, now declared to be perjured, as true. Therefore it merely
looked to the original trial record to see if it still thought this testimony
to be true. The court still believed the truth of this testimony and
therefore dismissed the petition for the writ of habeas corpus as ground-
less."3
This reasoning is subject to two flaws. First, there is nothing to
show that the state court even looked into the action in this cursory
manner. Since there was no state court record, and the petition was dis-
missed peremptorily the same day it was filed, the more reasonable in-
ference is that the state court neglected to give the petition even this
slight consideration. This would squarely conflict with Chessman v.
Teets, 4 which held that it is error to dismiss a prisoner's petition sum-
marily where it sets forth a denial of due process.
Assuming that the state court did give this limited consideration to
the petition the dissent points out that it still could not justify refusal to
grant a hearing on the averments of the petition. The question of co-
ercion by the district attorney was not an issue in the original trial.
Obviously, then, no amount of perusal of the trial transcript could deter-
mine the truth or falsity of petitioner's charge of denial of due process.
The United States Supreme Court long ago pointed out that the question
brought forward on habeas corpus is always distinct from that which is
involved in the cause itself."5 Therefore, it is difficult not to accept the
reasoning of the dissent which points out that, far from receiving "fair
consideration" in the state court, petitioner received no consideration
whatsoever.
The second ground advanced by the circuit court is that the refusal
of the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari to the state su-
preme court indicated approval of the state court's disposition of the
U.S. 760 (1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945); Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923).
11 Chessman v. Teets, 353 U. S. 928 (1957).
12People v. Simpson, 43 Cal. 2d 553, 275 P. 2d 31 (1954).
13 Simpson v. Teets, 239 F. 2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1956).
14350 U.S. 3 (1955).
15 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1804).
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petition. In spite of the fact that certiorari was denied without opinion,
the circuit court held the denial to be entitled to res judicata.
The effect to be given a denial of certiorari without opinion by the
United States Supreme Court was placed in doubt by Darr v. Buford."
That decision held that ordinarily certiorari must be invoked in an at-
tempt to secure review of a state court's refusal of relief prior to appli-
cation for habeas corpus in the federal system. This established the
proposition that application for writ of certiorari was essential to exhaust
the state remedies. Unfortunately, it also indicated to some courts that a
denial of certiorari gave a res judicata effect to the state court decision.
Subsequently, however, Brown v. llen, 8 firmly established that a prior
denial of certiorari could have no meaning whatsoever on a later petition
for habeas corpus and must be taken as without prejudice to an application
to any other court for the relief sought. 1" The logic of this rule is
obvious from the fact that frequently the United States Supreme Court
does not have to reach the merits of a case to decide to deny certiorari.
Further, where there is no opinion written the lower court has no way of
knowing whether or not the court reached the merits of the case.2"
In the absence of any records of the certiorari proceedings, it is difficult
to see how the circuit court justified its conclusion that the United States
Supreme Court disregarded the matter alleged in the petition before it
C"apparently owing to the previous complete review of the trial by the
state court."';2
The circuit court not only ran contrary to well established decisions
in the field of habeas corpus, but the concurring opinion served to com-
pound the error by attempting to justify the result by rationalization
rather than by legal principles.
By vacating the judgment of the circuit court, the United States
Supreme Court has prevented a complete circumvention of the purposes
of habeas corpus proceedings. To hold otherwise would deny petitioner
a hearing in either the state or federal court system on his charge that
he has been deprived of his constitutional right to due process of law.
However, it is to be regretted that the high court did not grasp the
opportunity to specifically expose the fallaciousness of the circuit court
majority opinion so that subsequent tribunals may be better guided
through this very fundamental area of law.
Don R. Work
16 339 U. S. 200 (1950).
17 Speller v. Allen, 192 F. 2d 477, 478 (4th Cir. 1951) ; Adkins v. Smyth,
188 F. 2d 452 (4th Cir. 1951).
Is 344 U.S. 443, 488-497 (1952).
19 U.S. ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1952); Ex Parte Abernathy,
320 U.S. 219 (1942): Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924); U.S. v. Carver,
260 U.S. 482 (1922).
20 Brown v. Allen, supra note 18.
21 Simpson v. Teets, 239 F. 2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1956).
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